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ABSTRACT
One major function of social networks (e.g., massive online
social networks) is the dissemination of information such
as scientific knowledge, news, and rumors. Information
can be propagated by the users of the network via nat-
ural connections in written, oral or electronic form. The
information passing from a sender to a receiver intrinsi-
cally involves both of them considering their self-perceived
knowledge, reputation, and popularity, which further de-
termine their decisions of whether or not to forward the
information and whether or not to provide feedback. To
understand such human aspects of the information dis-
semination, we propose a game theoretical model of the
information forwarding and feedback mechanisms in a so-
cial network that take into account the personalities of the
sender and the receiver (including their perceived knowl-
edgeability, reputation, and desire for popularity) and the
global characteristics of the network.
Keywords: Social Network, Learning, Knowledge, Game
Theory, Popularity, Reputation, Rumor.
1. INTRODUCTION
A social network is an ensemble of communicating per-
sonalities based on the concept of social proximity. The
members of a social network can form communities [9],
influence other members [2], and engage in other social
activities. One major function of social networks (in par-
ticular, massive online social networks) is the dissemina-
tion of information such as scientific knowledge, news, and
rumors [6, 7, 10, 12]. As an important form of social or-
ganization, information can shape public opinion, inform
and misinform the society, cause panic in a society, pro-
mote products, etc. [7]. Information can be propagated
by the members of the network via natural connections in
written, oral or electronic form.
Due to its importance, information dissemination or
diffusion has been one of the focuses in social network
research. For example, theories of rumor spreading are
proposed in [7, 12] to study the information dissemina-
tion. Game theoretical approach to information propa-
gation (namely, to learning) has been suggested by Gale
et al., Acemoglu et al. [1, 4]. Ellwardt and van Duijn
explored gossiping in small (organizational) social net-
works [3]. Since information dissemination (and other var-
ious social network activities) are supported by the struc-
tural organization of social networks, social network topol-
ogy receives a lot of research attention. For example, an
effect of network topology on the information diffusion was
observed in [5]: sparse networks are more effective for in-
formation entrance, and clustered (cellular) network struc-
ture decreases information diffusion.
In this paper, we propose a game theoretical model for
the information passing from a sender to a receiver in an
online social network. The novelty of our model is that
psychological characteristics are explicitly modeled in in-
formation dissemination. In our model, information pass-
ing intrinsically involves both parties considering their psy-
chological characteristics: self-perceived knowledge, repu-
tation, and popularity—which further determine their de-
cisions of whether or not to forward the information and
whether or not to provide feedback. The decisions are also
based on the global properties of the network, such as the
overall quality of information and the way unreliable ru-
mors are treated by the network members.
Our work differs from [7, 12], where a simple “infec-
tion” model was proposed for rumor spreading, and analyt-
ical and numerical solutions have been discussed. In par-
ticular, [12] shows that the fraction of network population
that never learns certain news, is a function of the fraction
of “refractory,” or disinterested network members. These
works identify three groups of network members: igno-
rants, spreaders, and stiflers (or susceptible, infected, and
refractory). When a spreader contacts another spreader
or a stifler, the initiating spreader becomes a stifler at a
rate α. When a spreader (sender) contacts an ignorant
(receiver), the ignorant becomes a spreader at a rate β [7].
The values of the parameters α and β are assumed to be
taken from the outside of the model.
Feedback in information dissemination is explicitly con-
sidered as strategic moves in our game theoretical model.
Related to our work, Lampe et al. also analyzed the mech-
anism of feedback, its influence on the members of online
communities, and its role in learning transfer [6]. Similar
concept of social influence, but in the context of commu-
nity building, has been researched by Crandall et al. [2].
2. MODEL OF INFORMATION
DISSEMINATION
In this section, we present our model for characterizing
users in social networks and for the information dissem-
ination between a sender and a receiver. Each user has
a utility function which is a combination of knowledge,
reputation, and popularity. The information passing be-
tween a pair of users involves learning, feedback, and util-
ity updating of both the sender and the receiver. Based on
the model introduced in this section, we propose a game
theoretic model to study the strategic actions of users in
Section 3. and then further look at the information dis-
semination in a network setting involving a large number
of users in Section 4..
Network
A social network can be modeled as a directed or undi-
rected graph G = (Z, Y ), where each vertex in the vertex
set Z represents a human user or an actor (denoted as A),
and each edge in the edge set Y represents a relationship
between a pair of actors. In online social networks, the
relationship is usually called “friendship” [13]. For most
offline and many online social networks (e.g., MySpace,
Facebook, LinkedIn), G is undirected. In this paper, we
assume that the network is connected and undirected.
We consider a homogeneous network where all actors or
vertices are equally important, i.e., the identity of a node
is not important. This allows us to consider the prolifera-
tion of information from an arbitrary actor S (sender) to
another arbitrary actor R (receiver), as long as the sender
and the receiver are connected in the network. Figure 1
shows the information propagation in an online social net-
work.
Assertion and Knowledge
We suppose that there is a discrete finite set F of N as-
sertions that is to be shared among a network of users or
actors. We assume that all assertions are equally impor-
tant.
An assertion intrinsically can be true or false. We use
ϕ to denote the probability that a randomly selected as-
sertion from the assertion set is true. Note that ϕ is a
system-wide parameter. The value of ϕ is higher for for-
mal communities (e.g., a scientific community) and lower
for informal communities (e.g., a chatroom).
In addition to its intrinsic objective truthfulness, each
assertion known to an actor has a subjective belief asso-
ciated with that actor: the actor either believes that the
assertion is true or false, or fails to make a decision for
herself. An assertion that an actor does not know to be
true or false is essentially a rumor—a “story. . . without
any known authority for [its] truth” [11].
An actor Ai ∈ Z knows Fi ≤ N assertions, among
which Ai subjectively (privately) believes F
+
i assertions
are true and F−i assertions are false, and treats all other
known assertions F ◦i as rumors (obviously, F
+
i + F
◦
i +
F−i ≡ Fi). The probability of a randomly chosen assertion
Φ ∈ F (from the whole assertion set for the network) being
known by Ai is given by fi = Fi/N . Similarly, we can find
the probability of an assertion believed as true, rumor, or
false as f+i = F
+
i /Fi, f
◦
i = F
◦
i /Fi, and f
−
i = F
−
i /Fi,
respectively.
S R
Figure 1: Communication between sender S and receiver
R.
Based on its own known set of assertions F i, actor Ai
forms its self-perceived knowledge Ki as follows:
Ki = F
+
i + F
−
i + λF
◦
i (1)
Here, λ ∈ [0, 1] is a “rumor discount” coefficient to capture
the extent that an actor is willing to treat rumors as part
of her knowledge. An actor with λ = 0 completely dis-
cards rumors from her self-perceived knowledge, whereas
an actor with λ = 1 treats all her known rumors as if they
were trustworthy assertions. Similar to Fi, knowledge Ki
is also bounded by N , and Fi ≤ Ki ≤ Ni. In this paper,
we assume that the value of λ is the same for all actors in a
social network. We further normalize an actor’s knowledge
as ki = Ki/N .
It is important to understand that the truthfulness of
an assertion is not necessarily in agreement with the actor’s
beliefs. A good example of the disagreement would be the
concept of the Flat World that was intrinsically false, but
perceived as true by the vast majority of actors before the
Enlightenment.
Based on their perceived knowledge, we roughly clas-
sify all actors into “Ignoramuses” (low Ki), “Mediocres”
(medium-ranged Ki), and “Gurus” (high Ki). No actor in
the network can definitely tell whether an assertion is true
or false. However, we assume that there exists an exter-
nal verification mechanism (an “oracle”) that knows the
definite answer.
Utility and Personality
The information passing from a sender to a receiver in-
trinsically involves both of them considering their self-
perceived knowledge, reputation, and popularity, which fur-
ther determines their decisions of whether or not to for-
ward the information and whether or not to provide feed-
back. An actor’s self-perceived knowledge, reputation, and
popularity collectively form its utility. The weights an ac-
tor put on these three utility components characterize this
actor’s personality. We will give a detailed explanation of
these concepts in this section.
We use a non-negative real number to measure an actor
Ai’s reputation Ci—“overall quality or character as seen
or judged by people in general” [11]. Lower values of Ci
mean lower trustworthiness in Ai, suggesting that opinions
expressed by Ai—such as information and feedback—were
questionable in the past and should be considered with a
grain of salt. In the extreme case of Ci = 0, actor Ai’s be-
liefs are completely not credible. On the contrary, higher
values of Ci mean that Ai’s subjective evaluation of asser-
tions has been regarded as historically highly credible.
We measure an actor’s popularity Pi using another non-
negative real number. An actor’s popularity in a social
network is somewhat synonymous to social visibility [8]:
Pi = 0 corresponds to an actor who does not speak in
public and in general is not even known to exist. An actor
with high popularity enjoys popular attention. We assume
that there is no correlation between Pi and Ci for the same
actor Ai and that popularity is time sensitive in the sense
that it decays or discounts over time. We suppose that an
actor’s popularity decays by ∆P = −δ per unit time unless
the actor participates in information exchange with other
nodes, such as sending out some assertion as a sender or
sending feedback as a receiver.
We further define normalized reputation and normal-
ized popularity as ci = Ci/N and pi = Pi/N . Note, in our
study, we choose N to be sufficiently large such that both
ci and pi are no larger than one.
We believe that the purpose of a rational actor being a
member of a social network is to maximize her utility Ui,
defined as a convex combination of knowledge, reputation,
and popularity with coefficients 0 ≤ κ, σ, pi ≤ 1, κ+σ+pi =
1:
Ui = κKi + σCi + piPi. (2)
We use a particular set of coefficients {κ, σ, pi} to char-
acterize a particular type of actors’ personality. For ex-
ample, κ = σ = 0, pi = 1 describe a network of “Internet
trolls” (actors, for whom bloated popularity is the primary
goal of networking). On the other hand, κ = σ = 0.5, pi =
0 probably corresponds to a scientific community of knowl-
edge seeking altruists who care about their reputation and
wisdom, but not about being quoted or even published.
In this paper, we focus on a homogeneous network
where all actors’ have the same utility function. We un-
derstand that in a real social network, actors are most
probably heterogeneous. We leave the heterogeneous net-
work as future work.
Information transmission between a pair of actors
During the passing of an assertion from an actor (the
sender) to another actor (the receiver), both actors up-
date their self-perceived knowledge, reputation, and pop-
ularity. This process involves evaluating knowledge, learn-
ing assertions, sending feedback, and updating reputation
and popularity. We now describe in this section the basic
steps that are performed in this process, but leave the dis-
cussion on the actors’ the strategic decision making in the
next section.
We assume that initially each actor pre-learns a ran-
dom collection of assertions, which she randomly classifies
as true assertions, false assertions or rumors, and that a
communication or assertion passing between a sender and
a receiver always takes a unit time.
Evaluating Knowledge
When an actor S has an assertion Φ ∈ F S to share with
her neighbors, she will decide whether to forward Φ to a
neighbor or hold it indefinitely1, in order to maximize her
utility, as defined by (2). If S sends Φ to her neighbor R
(receiver), then R may choose to respond to S with either
positive or negative feedback Ψ.
Upon receiving Φ from the sender, the receiver R may
or may not be able to decide if Φ is true or false, based on
the following considerations:
• The receiver’s self-perceived knowledge.
• The probability of Φ being true by nature (an intrinsic
or objective characteristic but not a subjective belief
by any actor), given by the system-wide parameter ϕ.
• The sender’s reputation, CS.
• The sender’s opinion on Φ: for an arbitrary assertion,
the probability of that assertion being perceived by
the sender as true or false is given by f+S or f
−
S ; the
sender has no definite opinion on the assertion with
the probability of f◦S .
Let g+ and g− be the probabilities of R deciding that
Φ is true or false respectively, and g◦ be the probability of
R failing to decide on Φ (i.e. declare it as a rumor). Note
that g+ + g− + g◦ = 1, because eventually R has to make
1Other strategies, such as holding the assertion just for a limited
time and then forwarding it, will be studied in future.
some decision. If both the sender S and the receiver R have
complete knowledge of all assertions (i.e., kR = kS = 1),
then we have:
g+ = f+S = f
+
R = ϕ,
g− = f−S = f
−
R = 1− ϕ,
g◦ = f◦S = f
◦
R = 0.
(3)
If R is an Ignoramus (kR = 0), we assume that R chooses
to trust the sender’s opinion f
{+,−,◦}
S , discounted by the
sender’s reputation cS . That is,
g+ = cSf
+
S ,
g− = cSf
−
S ,
g◦ = 1− g+ − g−.
(4)
In all other cases where (0 < kR < 1), we assume that
g{+,−} are weighted sums defined as:
g+ = kRϕ+ (1− kR) cSf
+
S ,
g◦ = (1− kR) (cSf
◦
S + (1− cS)) ,
g− = kR (1− ϕ) + (1− kR) cSf
−
S ,
(5)
where the receiver’s knowledge kR is a weighting factor.
Note, in the above probability computation, we can
guarantee that g+, g−, g◦ are no larger than 1 as rs is no
larger than 1 (as mentioned before, we choose N to be
sufficiently large).
Learning Assertion and Updating Knowledge and
Popularity
Once an assertion is transmitted from S to R, both S
and R’s knowledge and popularity may change due to the
transmission: S informs R of a potentially new assertion
Φ, and R corrects S’s opinion on Φ. When R receives
an assertion Φ, one of the following three scenarios can
happen:
1. R knows about Φ, and his new opinion on the asser-
tion, g{+,−,◦}, matches his existing opinion f{+,−,◦}.
In this case, R is not interested in Φ. He dis-
cards the assertion and does not improve S’s pop-
ularity. The probability of this scenario is p1 =
fR
(
g−f−R + g
+f+R + g
◦f◦R
)
, where fR is the total
number of assertions known to R.
2. R knows about Φ, but will reconsider his opinion (“I
was told the world is flat; hey, I thought it was a joke,
but the guy who told me the news traveled a lot!
Perhaps he’s right!”). In this scenario, R re-labels
Φ in the assertion set FR and gives S a popularity
increase of 1. Re-labeling Φ does not change FR, but
it can change KR (when Φ becomes a rumor or ceases
to be a rumor). The probability of this event is p2 =
fR
(
1−
(
g−f−R + g
+f+R + g
◦f◦R
))
.
3. Finally, Φ can be completely new to R. Then R stores
Φ in the assertion set FR and gives S a popularity in-
crease of 1. The number of assertions of R’s increases,
and the amount of knowledge of R’s increases, too.
This scenario happens with probability p3 = 1− fR.
Then, we see that the overall knowledge change at R’s side
is given by:
∆KR =λ (1− fR)
+ (1− λ)
(
g− + g+ − fR
(
f+R + f
−
R
))
.
(6)
Notice that if S knows a priori that R is already in the
possession of the assertion that S is about to share with
R, then the probability of the above third scenario is 0,
and (6) changes accordingly:
∆K′R = (1− λ)
(
g− + g+ − fR
(
f+R + f
−
R
))
. (7)
This situation may arise when S has reinterpreted the as-
sertion. We will not use (7) in our further analysis.
Unlike the receiver R, the sender S updates her knowl-
edge based on the feedback provided by R (if any). The
number of assertions at the sender’s side does not change,
only S’s opinion on them can change and S’s perceived
knowledge that depends on the opinion. If S trusts R (be-
cause of R’s high reputation CR), then S can change her
belief about Φ. The change is given by the formula:
∆KS = cR (1− λ)
(
g− + g+ −
(
f+S + f
−
S
))
. (8)
The total popularity premium to sender S is given by:
∆PS = 1− fR
(
g+f+R + g
−f−R + g
◦f◦R
)
. (9)
The receiver R enjoys the popularity growth of 1 only if
R chooses to send feedback to S (e.g., by commenting her
original assertion).
Sending Feedback and Updating Reputation
A feedback mechanism is used by R to affect the reputation
of the sender S and, eventually, R’s own reputation.
We use an actor Ai’s reputation Ci as the measure of
Ai’s ability to inspire belief. Actor Ai’s successful predic-
tion of the true nature of an assertion should increase Ci,
while an incorrect prediction should decrease it. Unfortu-
nately, no actor is the network knows the true value of a
random assertion (even a Guru can predict that an asser-
tion is true only with the probability of ϕ). That is why
we need an external oracle that compares R’s perception
of assertion Φ with the true nature of that assertion and
concludes if the evaluation was successful or not. If R is
a Guru (high kR), he makes the right choice and earns a
reputation value 1. If R is an Ignoramus, the best he can
do is to trust S (to the extent of the sender’s reputation).
In the latter case, R gets a reputation boost of (1× cS) if
S’s belief of Φ is accurate (which happens with the prob-
ability of ϕf+S + (1 − ϕ)f
−
S ), and a penalty of (−1× cS)
otherwise (with the probability of ϕf−S +(1−ϕ)f
+
S ). After
an assertion is passed between the sender and the receiver,
the expected change of the receiver’s reputation is:
∆CR = kR + (1− kR)
(
cS (2ϕ− 1)
(
f+S − f
−
S
))
. (10)
In the mean time, R can affect S’s reputation by pro-
viding feedback in the following way: if S and R agree on
their perceived nature of Φ (the true nature of Φ is not
involved) and the receiver is a credible authority himself,
then the sender’s reputation improves by value 1; other-
wise, it decreases by value 1. In other words:
∆CS = CR
( (
1− 2g+ − 2g−
) (
1− 2f+S − 2f
−
S
)
− 2
(
f+S g
+ + f−S g
−) ).
(11)
It is quite possible that the change of knowledge K,
numbers of known, true, false, and neutral assertions F ,
F+, F−, F ◦, popularity P or reputation C, resulting from
a communication, will make one or more of these values
greater than N or less than 0. Our model is not designed
to handle these situations and should be used only when
each of these numbers is greater than 1 and less than N−1.
This anomaly can be avoided by choosing N to be large.
3. TWO-PLAYER INFORMATION
DISSEMINATION GAME
In the previous section, we gave a detailed analysis of the
basic steps involved in the information transmission be-
tween two actors (a sender and a receiver) and described
how the two actors update their utilities (including self-
perceived knowledge, reputation, and popularity) depend-
ing on whether or not the sender transmits an assertion
to the receiver and whether or not the receiver sends feed-
back to the sender. However, we have not answered this
question yet: under what circumstances is the sender will-
ing to transmit an assertion and when does the receiver
decide to send feedback? In this section, we will address
this question under the assumption that both actors know
that each of them attempts to maximize its own utility,
and they are fully aware of the impact on their own utili-
ties from any combination of their individual choices.
Such a strategic interaction between the sender and
receiver can be naturally modeled as a game with both
actors being players. More specifically, both actors play
a rectangular 2 × 2 game with a non-zero sum. The util-
ity change of both players in the game are given by the
following payoff matrix:
M =
∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
∆U00S ,∆UR
... ∆U01S , κ∆KR − piδ
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
−piδ,−piδ
... −piδ,−piδ
∥∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
(12)
The rows correspond to the two available actions of the
sender (S0 and S1), and the columns correspond to the two
available actions of the receiver (R0 and R1). The sender
has to choose between two actions: to forward information
(S0) or not to forward information (S1). The receiver also
has to choose either to provide feedback (R0) or not to
provide feedback (R1). The combination of S1 and R0 is
not feasible as R cannot provide feedback for a message
that has not been sent by S.
It is not immediately clear if the two actors should play
this game in a cooperative fashion or not. In an informal
online environment (such as a chatroom, a Web forum,
or a political discussion club), actors are not necessarily
interested in optimizing their joint utility. Rather, their
individual utilities are of the primary importance. Such a
social behavior can be modeled as a non-cooperative game.
On the contrary, in selected “gated” environments such as
research seminars or hobbyist meetings, a receiver may
want to avoid excessive negative feedback to not hurt the
sender beyond necessity. In this situation, a cooperative
game makes more sense. Nevertheless, in this work we
are inclined to believe that a non-cooperative game better
reflects the communication in the real world, at least as
the first approximation.
By treating the information dissemination game de-
fined in (12) as a non-cooperative game, we have derived
the following theorem to characterize the Nash equilibrium
(if exists) of the game.
Theorem 3..1. The game defined by the matrix M has a
pure strategy weak Nash equilibrium.
Proof. We will prove the theorem by assuming that a
mixed strategy exists for the sender and that strategy is
a part of the Nash equilibrium. Let x be the probabil-
ity of S playing S0 and 1 − x the probability of play-
ing S1. The condition for the Nash equilibrium for the
receiver is x (∆UR) + (1− x) (−piδ) = x (κ∆KR − piδ) +
(1− x) (−piδ). From this follows that either x = 0 or
∆UR = κ∆KR − piδ. In the former case, S1 (“never for-
ward”) is the pure optimal strategy. In the latter case, x is
irrelevant and can be chosen to be either 0 or 1 (in the nu-
merical experiments, we select x = 1: “always forward”).
A similar proof can be constructed for the receiver.
We use {S∗i , R
∗
j} to denote the equilibrium strategy
profile of the game. At each such equilibrium, we can
find each actor’s state variables such as their utilities, and
normalized values popularity, reputation, and knowledge.
4. CASE STUDY: INFORMATION
DISSEMINATION IN NETWORK
We now explore the information dissemination process in
a network with a large number of actors, based on the two-
player game model introduced in the previous section. To
this end, we conducted a number of experiments by simu-
lating the information dissemination in discrete time steps
on a complete bidirectional social network of 1000 actors.
At each time step, one actor S is randomly chosen to play
the two-player information dissemination game with an-
other randomly chosen actor R. This is not an n-player
game, but a series of independent 2-player games. The
state values of both actors at Nash equilibrium for each
game are recorded. Recall that we assume each such game
can be completed in one time step.
The model parameters of our simulations are as follows.
The probability of an assertion being true is ϕ = 0.8. The
actor popularity decay factor is δ = 0.1. The rumor dis-
count coefficient is λ = 0.5. The maximum number of
assertions in the network is N = 2000.
In each experiment, the network was populated by ac-
tors of a certain type. In the first experiment, all actors
were “Internet trolls”: κ = 0.1, σ = 0.1, pi = 0.8; in
the second experiment, we modeled an “Internet expert”
community: κ = 0.2, σ = 0.7, pi = 0.1; finally, in the
third experiment 50% of the actors were randomly chosen
to be “experts,” and the rest of them were “trolls.” In
each experiment, a third of the actors initially started as
“Ignoramuses” (k = 0.1), another third as “Mediocres”
(k = 0.5), and the remaining third as “Gurus” (k = 0.9).
The initial values of reputation r, popularity p, and the
fractions of true and false assertions f+, f− were drawn
uniformly at random between the minimum value of 0 and
the maximum values of 0.5 for f− and 1 for the other three
parameters.
For the duration of 10 million assertion transmissions
(on average 10,000 communications per actor), we moni-
tored the distribution of k in the network and the “qual-
ity” of knowledge—the average values of f+ and f−—as
functions of the simulation time (the simulation time is de-
fined as the average number of communications per actor).
The results of sample simulation runs for the first two ex-
periments are shown in Figures 2 and 3. The results of
the third experiment (with the equal mix of “expert” and
“troll” actors) are somewhere in between the two extreme
cases, and they are not shown here.
One can tell from Fig. 2 that both models converge
to stable states; however, the states are not the same.
The “troll” community converges to the state of “total
knowledge,” where all actors become fully knowledgeable
(f ≈ k ≈ 1) after a finite number of iterations. The distri-
bution of information in the “expert” community, on the
contrary, changes (disperses) only marginally in time. The
difference is due to the fact that the troll utility function
mostly ignores reputation, but favors popularity, and trolls
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Figure 2: Distribution of actors by k as a function of sim-
ulation time. Top: “troll” community; bottom: “expert”
community.
almost always choose to spread assertions without fear-
ing the potentially harmful feedback. The expert utility
function emphasizes reputation, thus preventing “experts”
from distributing information of uncertain nature.
The quality of knowledge in the “troll” community
eventually converges to the statistical levels determined
by f+ = ϕ = 0.8 and f− = 1 − ϕ = 0.2 in Fig. 3).
This implies that using the knowledge evaluation mech-
anism as defined before, actors cannot classify assertions
better than statistically possible. The expert network does
not converge even to the statistically possible level for the
reason described above. It does not follow from this ob-
servation that “expert” communities are slowing down or
blocking information exchange: they are merely practicing
a more cautious approach.
Another important difference between the models in
Fig. 2 is the significant dispersion of the learning speeds
in the “expert” community: a fair fraction of “Ignora-
muses” and “Mediocres” learn much faster than the other
actors in the same class. To understand the nature of this
phenomenon, we recorded the personality parameters—
namely, reputation r and popularity p—of all actors at
the time 800 (just after the bifurcation in the Fig. 2). We
did not see any correlation between k and p. However, the
correlation between k and r was overwhelming (Fig. 4).
The Figure suggests that actors with lower reputation
learn faster, and the learning speed is lower for the ac-
tors with higher initial knowledge. This means that actors
with initially low knowledge and low reputation actively
gain knowledge to increase their utility, while those with
initially high knowledge (“Gurus”) or high reputation have
less incentive to learn new knowledge.
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Figure 3: Quality of knowledge in the “expert” and “troll”
communities as a function of time.
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5. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper we proposed a game theoretical model of
information dissemination in social networks. The model
takes into account both personal traits of the users of the
network (the desire for self-perceived knowledge, reputa-
tion, and popularity) and the properties of the dissemi-
nated information (in particular, its overall truthfulness).
The feedback mechanism is used to control the reputation
of information senders and deter them from disseminating
unconfirmed rumors. The model is mathematically rep-
resented by a 2 × 2 non-zero sum, non-cooperative game
with a pure strategy Nash equilibrium, where the avail-
able actions to a sender is to forward an assertion or in-
formation or hold it indefinitely and a receiver needs to
decide whether to provide feedback or not. Our numerical
experiments show that a massive social network of actors
communicating using the proposed model demonstrates in-
tuitively acceptable aggregate learning behavior.
To extend and generalize our model, we proposed the
following future research directions.
• The variability of κ, σ, and pi for different actors in a
network will be considered in our future work.
• A common strategy in real social network is not to for-
ward an assertion immediately or hold it indefinitely,
but to hold for a limited time. We will incorporate
the delayed strategies in our game theoretic model.
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